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Abstract 
Air transport has become a vital component of the global economy. However, greenhouse gas 
emissions from this sector have a significant impact on global climate, being responsible for over 
3.5% of all anthropogenic radiative forcing. Also, the accrued visibility of aircraft emissions greatly 
deteriorates the public image of the industry. In this context, incentive-based regulations, in the form 
of price or quantity controls, can be envisaged as alternatives to mitigate these emissions. 
 The use of environmental charges in air transport and the inclusion of the sector in the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) are considered under a range of scenarios. The impacts 
of these measures on demand are estimated, and results suggest that they are likely to be minimal, 
mainly due to the high willingness to pay for air transport. In particular, in the EU ETS scenario 
currently favoured by the EU, demand reductions are smaller than 2%. This conclusion need not be 
valid in the longer run, for short trips, or if future caps become more stringent in the system. 
Furthermore, given current estimates of the social cost of CO2 as well as typical EU ETS prices, 
supply-side abatement would be too costly to be encouraged by these policies in the short term. The 
magnitude of aviation CO2 emissions in the EU is estimated, both in physical and monetary terms; the 
results are consistent with Eurocontrol estimates and, for the EU-25, the total social cost of these 
emissions represents only 0.03% of the region’s GDP. 
 This study concludes that the use of multi-sector policies, such as the EU ETS, is unsuitable for 
curbing emissions from air transport itself. To that end, stringent emission charges or an isolated ETS 
would be better suited instruments. However, including aviation in the EU ETS has advantages under 
target-oriented post-2012 scenarios, such as policy costs dilution, certainty in reductions and 
flexibility in abatement allocation. This solution is also attractive to airlines, which would improve 
their public image with virtually no reduction of their own emissions, as they would be fully capable 
of passing on policy costs to their customers. 
 
Keywords: carbon permits, carbon tax, emissions aviation, EU ETS aviation, climate change, 
Pigouvian tax, tradable permits, global warming, carbon emissions, taxes vs permits, emissions 
trading, carbon trading 
 
1. Introduction 
Air transport has ignited a revolution in the global economy, reducing travel times and allowing 
passengers and cargo to span distances unimaginable until recently. As of 2006, aviation 
transports approximately 2 billion passengers annually and has an impact on the global 
economy estimated at 8% of the world's GDP (Thompson, 2006, p.1). According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), global air passenger traffic has increased 
at approximately 9% per year since 1960, a rate which is far superior to the average GDP 
growth rate for the same period (IPCC, 1999, summary chapter 1). The sector is projected to 
continue growing by about 3-7% per year, at least until 2015 (Brasseur et al, 1998). With the 
recent publication of the Stern Review (2006), a robust economic analysis of global warming 
and possible policies, the need for immediate action has become clear. The choice of policy 
instruments by governments is essential and aviation is one of the sectors that need the most 
attention in this respect: ‘the level of the carbon price faced by aviation should reflect the full 
contribution of emissions from aviation to climate change’ (Stern Review, p.341). 
 Aviation is a CO2-intensive mode of transport: its average emissions per passenger kilometre 
are greater than those from rail travel by a factor of two (Tyndall Centre, 2001). The best 
estimates yielded by meteorological models indicate that, in 1992, the radiative forcing
1
 by 
aircraft corresponded to approximately 3.5% of all anthropogenic radiative forcing (IPCC, 
1999, section 6.6.3). Section 2 of this paper presents an overview of emissions from aviation as 
well as their impact on radiative forcing and estimates of their magnitude in physical and 
monetary equivalent terms. 
It could be argued that technological progress might have a significant influence in the 
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  Radiative forcing is defined as an alteration in the balance between the share of solar radiation that is absorbed by 
the atmosphere and the share of radiation reflected into space. It can be caused by a change in the concentration of a 
greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, for example. A positive radiative forcing causes an increase in the average 
temperature of the Earth, whereas a negative radiative forcing implies a decrease in this temperature. Radiative 
forcing is measured in W/m2 (watts per square metre). 
evolution of emissions from air transport, affecting the development of more fuel-efficient 
aircraft and air traffic procedures. Indeed, during the last decades only, this efficiency improved 
at an average rate of 1.7% per year (IPCC, 1999, summary 6.1). Although even higher rates are 
expected in the future (British Airways, 2005, p.3), these improvements are expected to be 
largely offset by the increase in volume of the sector's activity. As a consequence, in a business-
as-usual scenario, with no policy instruments employed for mitigation, the annual growth in 
emissions until 2015 is predicted to remain between 3% and 4% (IPCC, 1999, summary section 
3; Wit et al, 2005, p.140). 
The air transport sector is not covered by Kyoto protocol targets, and therefore it undergoes 
weaker pressure to curb its emissions. However, the European Union has recently expressed its 
view that aviation should be encompassed by the European environmental policy framework 
(EC, 2005a, p.3). Moreover, it has indicated that it intends to include international aviation in 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) (EC, 2005a, p.4; Hartridge, 2006, slide 10; 
Zapfel, 2006, slide 19). Section 3 outlines the main types of economic instruments that could be 
employed in air transport.  
 Section 4 discusses and estimates the supply and demand-side effects of the application of 
environmental regulation to aviation. Section 5 addresses the choice between price and quantity 
controls. Section 6 presents conclusions and policy recommendations. 
 
2. Emissions from air transport 
The aircraft emissions that have a significant contribution to climate change are carbon dioxide 
(CO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulphur compounds (SOxO and H2SO4), water vapour (H2O) and 
aerosols (sulphur particles and soot) (IPCC, 1999, summary section 4). Their contribution can 
be either direct or indirect, depending on the chemical species considered.  
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the unavoidable product of combustion and it is by far the most 
important greenhouse gas. As solar radiation, reflected on the surface of the Earth, makes its 
way up the atmosphere, it is absorbed by CO2 molecules and induces their thermal agitation. 
Therefore, an increase in CO2 concentration in the troposphere leads to positive radiative 
forcing, and as a result, to an increase in temperature. The amount of CO2 emitted by an aircraft 
during flight is determined by the total amount of fuel consumed. For instance, for every 
kilogram of kerosene burned, 3.16 kilograms of CO2 are emitted into the atmosphere (EEA, 
2005, annex of chapter B851).  
Nitrogen oxides (NOx) are the by-product of high-temperature combustions and are produced 
in a smaller quantity compared to CO2. These emissions do not depend directly on the amount 
of fuel used, but rather on operating conditions and design of the engine (Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution, 2002, p.21, paragraph 4.3). Nitrogen oxides are not greenhouse gases 
themselves. Nevertheless, they have an important influence on the concentration of some 
greenhouse gases like methane (CH4) and ozone (O3) in the atmosphere. 
 H2O emissions can present themselves in three different forms: water vapour, line-shaped 
contrails and cirrus clouds. Water vapour emissions from air transport are small, but effects of 
contrails and cirrus clouds are very significant. However, there is still much uncertainty as to the 
real magnitude of their impact on climate change. Moreover, their occurrence is strongly 
dependent on local variables such as air temperature, pressure and winds, creating legal barriers 
to the attribution of environmental impact liability to airlines (Wit et al, 2002, p.23). 
 Sulphur oxides (SOxO) and sulphuric acid (H2SO4) are produced by chemical reactions 
involving the small quantities of sulphur present in aircraft fuel. However, in addition to being 
very small, this negative effect is counterbalanced by the positive radiative forcing of soot 
aerosols, produced by incomplete combustion in aircraft engines. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the global radiative forcing (in W/m
2
) due to air transport, 
along with estimates for individual impacts for each type of emission. 
Table 1: Relative impact of aviation emissions in terms of radiative forcing (quantities in W/m
2
) 
 
   
Emission 1992 (middle estimate) 2050 (projected) 
   
   
CO2 +0.018 +0.074 
O3 (from NOx) +0.023 +0.060 
CH4 -0.014 -0.045 
Stratospheric H2O +0.002 +0.004 
Contrails +0.02 +0.10 
Cirrus 0-0.04 0-0.16 
Sulphate aerosols -0.003 -0.009 
Soot aerosols +0.003 +0.009 
Total +0.049 + cirrus +0.193 + cirrus 
   
 
Source: Wit et al (2002, p.23, based on data from IPCC, 1999) 
 
It is clear that the most significant impacts from air transport on climate are due to emissions 
of CO2, NOx and H2O. However, given the relatively poor level of scientific understanding of 
H2O, as well as the problems arising in determining the liability for these effects, the emissions 
most likely to be addressed by an economic instrument would be CO2 and NOx. 
In relative terms, the impact of aviation corresponds to 3.5% of the total radiative forcing by 
all anthropogenic activities. According to NASA projections (reported in IPCC, 1999, chapter 6 
summary), the growth in the global aircraft fleet alone would lead to an aircraft-induced 
radiative forcing of 0.11 Wm
-2
 in 2015, about 5% of all anthropogenic activity in that year. 
Longer-term projections made by the IPCC suggest that the aircraft-induced radiative forcing in 
2050 could amount to anywhere from 2.6 to 11 times the value in 1992 (IPCC, 1999, summary 
section 4.8). 
This impact, combined with the accrued public visibility of the sector (Thompson, 2006, 
pp.1-2), has led air transport to be regarded as a very environmentally unfriendly activity in 
recent years. Environmental lobbying groups (EFTE, 2001; Gazzard, 2004), specialised 
(Thompson, 2006) and popular media (BBC News, 2004; Joarder, 2004; Walters, 2002), policy 
makers (EAC, 2003), and even airlines themselves (British Airways, 2005) have expressed their 
concerns over the environmental impact of aviation. Airlines and air transport organisations are 
without a doubt aware of this situation (Thompson, 2006, p.1-2). 
2.1 The externality in Europe 
From an economic perspective, greenhouse gas emissions from aircraft are regarded as a 
negative externality, thus resulting in social welfare losses. In order to estimate the magnitude 
of this externality, data on the number of flights departing from the EU 15 countries were 
obtained from Eurostat for the years 2003 and 2004 (Eurostat, 2006). The data include the 
number of domestic, international intra-EU and international extra-EU flights divided into 67 
aircraft categories. Most of these categories have corresponding EMEP generic aircraft types 
(EEA, 2005, annex of chapter B851), which allow the use of CORINAIR emission factors in 
estimating CO2 emissions for both landing and take-off (LTO) and climb, cruise and descent 
(CCD) cycles. In some cases, finer estimates, obtained using the PIANO model (EEA, 2005, 
annex of chapter B851), were available. For those aircraft categories where both EMEP aircraft 
type and PIANO output were lacking, emission factors for similar-sized aircraft were used. For 
categories where only the manufacturer of the aircraft was specified, emission factors 
corresponding to a representative aircraft of the manufacturer were used.  
 For each flight category – domestic, international intra-EU and international extra-EU flights 
– an average mission length was calculated. This average length was obtained from aggregated 
data on EU flights from Eurocontrol (Wit et al, 2005, pp.240-243), which contain the total 
number of flights and kilometres flown for each flight category. A summary of the results is 
shown in Table 2 for the EU 15 countries.  
Table 2: CO2 emissions from flights departing from the EU 15 and the EU 25 (in thousands of 
tonnes) 
 
     
              2003                             2004 
 EU 15 EU 25 EU 15 EU 25 
     
     
Domestic flights 10,594 10,711 10,892 11,089 
International intra-EU 41,119 42,969 45,321 48,603 
International extra-EU 52,404 55,205 52,243 54,768 
Total 104,118 108,886 108,456 114,460 
Monetary equivalent (€) 3,157,886,224 3,302,502,658 3,415,269,976 3,604,349,688 
     
 
 Source: Calculations using Eurostat data, Eurocontrol information on aggregate volume of 
activity from Wit et al (2005, pp.240-243), and estimates on the social cost of carbon from 
Clarkson and Deyes (2002) 
 
 The choice of “emissions from flights departing from the EU” as a proxy for the size of the 
externality in Europe is a somewhat arbitrary one. However, it is a very reasonable solution, 
since it results in the greatest possible coverage of emissions without the occurrence of double 
counting, should other regions be included in the calculations. In addition, it is crucial to note 
that the estimates obtained with this very simple method take into account only the aircraft type 
and straight-line flight distance. Other influential parameters, such as flight paths and levels, 
atmospheric conditions at flight altitude, fuel quality and suboptimal air traffic management 
(ATM) procedures (e.g. flight holding and queuing for take-off and/or landing), are not taken 
into account, since such factors vary greatly from flight to flight and are not included in Eurostat 
data. Therefore, one might regard these results as underestimates. Nevertheless, these totals are 
quite consistent with those obtained from more complex models. Eurocontrol (in Wit et al, 
2005, pp.240-243), for example, estimates aggregated emissions from flights departing from the 
EU 15 to have been of 124 million tonnes of CO2 in 2003 and of 130 million tonnes of CO2 in 
2004, which fall within a margin of less than 20% of the present study's estimates. The totals 
obtained here were also verified against calculations using outputs from the PIANO model, and 
the results were highly satisfactory. 
 Obtaining a monetary estimate of the magnitude of the externality requires the use of the 
social cost of CO2. In recent years there have been a number of studies on the subject 
(Nordhaus, 1991; Cline, 1993; Fankhauser, 1993; Maddison, 1994; Nordhaus, 1994; Eyre et al, 
1999; Tol, 1999; Tol and Downing, 2000) and estimates differ greatly. A recent review of these 
studies by Clarkson and Deyes (2002) suggests a value of £70 for the social cost of carbon in 
the year 2000. This result, actualised according to the method recommended by the authors, 
yields €30.33 and €31.49 as the social cost of CO2 in 2003 and 2004
2
, respectively. In this way, 
aircraft CO2 emissions from flights departing from the EU 15 countries can be valued at 
€3,157,886,224 for 2003 and €3,415,269,976 for 2004, both representing approximately 0.03% 
of the EU 15 gross domestic product for the years considered. 
 The calculation was repeated with the inclusion of the ten new members of the European 
Union
3
 using data for the 25 countries available from Eurostat (Eurostat, 2006). Monetary 
estimates calculated using the same method also suggest a negligible economic relevance for 
these emissions, as their value remains at approximately at 0.03% of the EU 25 GDP. A 
summary of these results is also given in Table 2.  
 The values obtained for the estimates of the externality in monetary terms are surprisingly 
small, and contrast with the relatively high amount of radiative forcing caused by aircraft 
emissions. In addition, considering the ample negative repercussions of air transport emissions 
in the views of public opinion, one would expect them to represent a more significant share of 
the region's GDP. 
 The validity of these estimates could perhaps be disputed on the grounds that non-CO2 
emissions from aviation were ignored. Although this is true, calculations show that even if non-
                                               
2 The original result from Clarkson and Deyes (2002) suggests a social cost of 70 pounds per tonne of elementary 
carbon for the year 2000. Estimates for subsequent years are obtained by adding 1 pound per year and by using the 
EU GDP growth as an actualisation factor. In order to obtain the estimate for the social cost of carbon dioxide in 
euros per tonne of CO2, a stoichiometric conversion factor of 12/44 = 0.2727 and the 2005 average exchange rate 
between British pounds and euros (Eurostat, 2006)  were used. 
3 In fact, only 24 countries are taken into account, as no data for Lithuania was available from Eurostat. 
CO2 emissions were converted to their CO2 equivalent using radiative forcing as a metric, total 
emissions would represent 0.09% of the EU GDP. 
 
3. Policy options for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions 
In recent years, many studies have proposed and discussed different alternatives for tackling the 
environmental impact of emissions from air transport (Bleijenberg and Wit, 1998; Carlsson and 
Hammar, 2002; Dings et al, 2003; Mendes de León et al, 1997; Tsai and Petsonk, 2000; Wit et 
al, 2002; Wit et al, 2005). Typically, these policy options can be divided into command-and-
control (CAC) and incentive based (IB) regulations (Carlsson and Hammar, 2002, p.365; 
Tietenberg, 1990) and the latter tend to be more efficient than the former (Baumol and Oates, 
1988). Incentive-based mechanisms can be further categorised into two main types of 
approaches: price and quantity controls. 
 Price controls, such as emission charges, are the simplest incarnation of the “polluter pays” 
principle and one of the most widely used types of economic instrument in environmental 
policy. However, their lack of flexibility often makes it a less favoured option by the industry 
(Carlsson and Hammar, 2002, p.365; Pizer, 2002, p.441; Thompson, 2006, p.1). 
 Quantity controls generally assume the form of emissions trading schemes, also known as 
cap-and-trade systems. In contrast to CAC systems, where a fixed limit of emissions is imposed 
for each individual agent, the tradability of allowances causes for reductions to occur where 
abatement costs are lower. The possibility of flexibly allocating rents associated with emission 
rights, the room for windfall profits and the flexibility of design also give such a system 
considerable support from the industry (Pizer, 2002, p.409; Carlsson and Hammar, 2002, 
p.368). 
 There are a number of possible initial allocation methods, such as grandfathering, 
benchmarking and auctioning (Goulder, 1999; Tietenberg, 2002, p.10). Auctioning is 
technically the best allocation method, as it reduces barriers to entry, increases regulation 
stringency and generates revenues that can be recycled for environmental purposes. However, it 
finds very little support in the industry. Grandfathering, on the other hand, is a more widely 
accepted option, but does not apply the “polluter pays” principle in full4. 
 
3.1 The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
In this study, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), set up in 2003, is used 
as the model for an emissions trading scheme. The EU ETS is the European initiative to 
implementing a Kyoto-oriented economic instrument to mitigate aggregated greenhouse gas 
emissions in its Member States. For the first two trading periods, 2005-2007 and 2008-2012, 
aggregated emission caps were imposed on the most energy-intensive sectors, namely cement, 
glass, ceramics, paper, steel and iron, as well as the power sector (EC, 2003, Annex I). In this 
way, the EU ETS covered over 11,000 installations and more than half of EU CO2 emissions 
from 2005 to 2007 (EC, 2005a, p.5). Allocation is made by grandfathering combined with a 
very small percentage of auctioning (5% and 10% at most, for the first and second periods, 
respectively). Allocation decisions are made at EU level, based on each country's National 
Allocation Plan (NAP) (EC, 2000, p.18). 
 According to Olivia Hartridge, Administrator of International Policy and EU ETS at the DG 
Environment of the European Commission, in a presentation at the CarbonExpo 2006 
conference (10/05/2006, Cologne, Germany), the European Commission is determined to take 
the necessary measures to reinforce the position of the EU ETS as a long-term system and 
ensure its continuity even after the deadline of the Kyoto Protocol targets (Hartridge, 2006). 
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 A priori, having allowances distributed free of charge might lead to the conclusion that the “polluter pays” principle 
is not applied at all. However, one must consider the opportunity costs that come with the use of allowances: by 
emitting one tonne of CO2, the polluter is giving up the earning he would make by selling one allowance – which was 
distributed gratis – at the market price. The incentive, however, is smaller than in the case of auctioned allowances, 
where the polluters must pay upfront for allowances. 
3.2 A brief history of environmental policy in civil aviation 
Regardless of the significance of aircraft emissions to climate change and the negative 
environmental image of air transport in the eyes of public opinion (Thompson, 2006, p.1), the 
air transport industry enjoys a considerable lack of regulation in terms of environmental policy 
(Whitelegg and Cambridge, 2004). Inertia marks politicians' attitudes towards environmental 
policy in air transport and, and in the specific case of the EU, the only country to tax the fuel 
used in domestic aviation is Holland (EC, 2005a, p.6). In addition, under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, international aviation is never dealt with directly, 
as the Kyoto Protocol states that emissions from this mode of transport should be addressed by 
the ICAO (United Nations, 1998, paragraph 2.2). 
However, apart from the establishment of engine emission and noise standards and 
restrictions on flight movements (Carlsson and Hammar, 2002, p.365; IPCC, 1999, summary 
section 6.4) no significant action has been taken by the ICAO. Since the entry into force of the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1998, the ICAO has set up a committee to analyse the implementation of 
different incentive-based alternatives for mitigating emissions from aviation at a global scale, 
but it has so far been unable to provide a concrete proposal. This is somewhat understandable, 
given the complexity of proceedings inside the ICAO: any policy it endorses must be agreed by 
its 188 member countries, some of which have radically different positions towards climate 
change policy. 
Finally, there are many treaties and bilateral agreements between countries to prevent 
aviation fuel from being taxed (ICAO, 1996). Since the level of CO2 emissions from an aircraft 
is inextricably linked to fuel consumption (EEA, 2005), there might be controversy as to 
whether imposing an environmental levy would lead to non-compliance with these treaties and 
agreements (Wit et al, 2002, p.81). In 1996 the ICAO Council declared that it would endorse the 
concept of an international emissions trading scheme (ICAO, 1996), and that it would not be 
opposed to an environmental levy, provided that it is implemented as a charge and not a tax. 
 Conscious of the obstacles faced by the ICAO in proposing a solution at a global scale, and 
considering itself “a major player in global aviation” (EC, 2005a, p.5), the European Union 
announced that it would itself undertake effective policy measures regarding aviation emissions 
if no action were agreed upon by the ICAO by 2002 (EC, 2005a, p.5). More recently, it has 
indicated its intention to include aviation in the EU ETS as a form of taking the first step 
towards the participation of global aviation in the carbon markets (EC, 2005a, p.5; Hartridge, 
2006, slide 10; Zapfel, 2006, slide 19). Upon request of the European Commission, CE Delft 
has elaborated a feasibility study (Wit et al, 2005), and ICF International has produced a 
detailed analysis of the impact of such inclusion on EU ETS allowance prices (ICF, 2006). An 
Aviation Working Group (AWG) has been set up under the European Climate Change Program 
(ECCP) to study the details of the process, and the European Parliament is expected to have a 
legislative proposal by the end of 2006 (EC, 2005a, p.11). 
 
4. Potential impacts from different policies 
If indeed the air transport sector were to be covered by a EU-wide type of IB environmental 
regulation, be it in the form of an emissions trading scheme or emission charges, emissions 
abatement would consist of demand and supply-side reactions to the economic incentive of the 
policy. Both types of effects are assessed in this section, in the scope of the European Union. 
This seems reasonable given that the EU is responsible for more than half of the world's air 
transport volume (EC, 2005a, p.5) and that it is the only region where a concrete proposal for an 
emissions trading scheme for aviation exists.  
 However, it should be emphasised that there are a number of aspects of the possible 
inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS that have not yet been clarified, such as the coverage of 
emissions (CO2 and NOx, CO2 only, etc.), aircraft models to be included, the geographical scope 
of flights to be covered, definition of trading entities, details of the allocation process and the 
monitoring method to be used (EC, 2005a, p.12; Wit et al, 2005). Therefore, a number of 
assumptions were necessary. These assumptions are based on indications from recent public 
presentations by officers of the European Commission (such as those by Olivia Hartridge and 
Peter Zapfel at the CarbonExpo 2006, in Cologne, Germany) and documents from the ECCP 
AWG meetings as to what decisions are likely to be taken regarding aviation and the EU ETS. 
 Carbon dioxide (CO2) will be assumed to be the only type of emission to be covered. This is 
without a doubt a suboptimal solution, but difficulties in measuring levels of NOx emissions and 
uncertainties regarding the magnitude of contrails and cirrus clouds impacts make mitigating 
such emissions via a wide-ranging emissions trading scheme or charge an unfeasible task in the 
foreseeable future
5
. 
The assumption of aircraft operators as trading entities is likely to be the most efficient 
choice, given that individual sources of emissions tend to be better informed about their 
abatement costs (Zhang and Nentjes, 1998). Since it is impossible to predict what the price of 
EU ETS allowances will be in the post-2012 period, three historically coherent price levels will 
be used: €7, €15 and €30 per tonne of CO2 (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006, pp.14-15). All 
assumptions are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Assumptions for policy configurations used for analysis 
 
   
 EU ETS Emission charge 
   
   
Allowance price / levy  €7/tCO2 €42/tCO2 
  €15/tCO2  
  €30/tCO2  
Geographic scope Flights departing from the EU Flights departing from the EU 
Trading entities Aircraft operators Aircraft operators 
Allocation decision EU Level EU Level 
Reduction targets 2012 Baseline Social efficiency 
Allocation method Grandfathering  
 Auctioning  
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 The European Commission has considered the use of a multiplier to account for the impact of aircraft NOx 
emissions. In this way, NOx emissions would be converted to their equivalent in CO2 emissions in terms of radiative 
forcing (or other metric) and treated as such in the EU ETS. However, this solution is highly unsatisfactory for two 
reasons: firstly, NOx emissions are not directly linked to fuel consumption, and therefore to CO2 emissions; secondly, 
such a strategy would encourage CO2-NOx trade-offs in turbofan engine configurations (ECCP, 2006, pp.5-6). 
In the discussion of an emission charge as the choice of economic instrument, it will be 
assumed that it is set approximately at the social cost of CO2. Using the results from Clarkson 
and Deyes (2002) for the social cost of carbon in the year 2000 and the actualisation method 
recommended by the authors, it is estimated at approximately €42/tCO2 in the year 2012.
6
 In 
theory, such a charge would lead the level of activity to its social optimum.  
 
4.1 Supply-side abatement 
Whereas demand-side emissions reductions generated by IB regulation are simply a reflex to a 
possible increase in prices, supply-side effects include a much broader range of measures to be 
implemented or influenced by aircraft operators. The least costly of these measures appears to 
be the optimisation of flight speeds and Air Traffic Management (ATM) to minimise fuel 
consumption. As they stand, national and international ATM systems are a source of inefficient 
routings, holding (airborne aircraft waiting for permission to land), and suboptimal flight 
profiles, which result in excess fuel consumption and, consequently, excess CO2 emissions. It is 
estimated that improvements in ATM could potentially reduce aviation emissions by between 
6% and 12% (IPCC, 1999, summary section 6.3). Regarding the optimisation of flight speeds, it 
has been shown that flying at a minimum-emissions speed leads to a reduction of 15% to 25% 
in CO2 emissions, compared to the maximum-emissions speed, for any given aircraft and route 
(Wit et al, 2002)  
 Other supply-side measures include: technical adaptations (e.g. retrofitting of winglets and 
riblets), greater efficiency or reduction in use of auxiliary power, shorter taxiing times, 
acceleration in fleet renewal, shift in new aircraft sales towards cleaner aircraft, and network 
and frequency changes to increase load factors (IPCC, 1999, summary sections 6.1-6.3; Wit et 
al, 2005, pp.126-127). 
                                               
6 The year 2012 is of particular interest since it is the most likely date for the EU to include aviation in its 
environmental policy framework. The exact value obtained for the social cost of CO2 in 2012 is €41.84/tCO2. 
 The use of a more environmentally friendly fuel is unfortunately not an option in the air 
transport industry for the next few decades, since at the present state of technology jet-powered 
aircraft require high energy density fuels. Hydrogen might become available as a long term 
alternative (IPCC, 1999, summary section 6.2), but it would demand major structural changes in 
aircraft and airport facilities. It should be noted that although the use of hydrogen would 
literally eliminate emissions of carbon dioxide from aviation, it would increase emissions of 
water vapour, which is the only by-product of hydrogen oxidisation. 
 It is clear that multiple sources for emission abatement exist in aviation. However, a 
consensus exists that these opportunities are significantly more expensive than those in other 
sectors (EC, 2000, p.27; IATA, 2001, p.26; ICF, 2006, p.9; Wit et al, 2005, p.85), which may 
lead aircraft operators to simply absorb the costs of any IB environmental policy applied to the 
sector or, if possible, just pass them on to customers. Unless drastic changes take place in the 
cap set by the EU on the trading sectors of the EU ETS, the conclusion that prices will remain at 
present levels, and therefore that short-term abatement from aviation is highly unlikely to occur, 
is a very plausible one.  ICF (2006) and Wit et al (2005) show that, given current levels of 
allocation, the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS is not expected to induce increases in 
allowance prices. It is important to highlight that this reasoning is built on the hypothesis that 
aircraft operators will be able to pass policy costs on to customers.  
 
4.2 Demand-side effects 
Price increases in air travel would be the natural consequence of the implementation of an IB 
policy in civil aviation, should airlines and aircraft operators decide to pass the policy costs to 
customers. This is very likely to happen, especially regarding charter and low-cost airlines, 
which allegedly operate on very small profit margins (Oxera, 2003; Wit et al 2005, p.132). 
Research on scheduled carriers also suggests that increasing fares might be one of their 
dominant responses (Alamdari and Brewer, 1994, in Wit et al 2005, p.132; EC, 2005b, 
executive summary). In this case, substitution for other modes of transport, notably rail and 
coach travel, would be encouraged. However, the scope of this substitution is limited to short-
haul routes only, where road or rail links are available. According to the IPCC (1999, summary 
section 6.4) up to 10% of intra-European travel could be transferred from air transport to rail.  
 In order to estimate the impact of environmental policies on air travel demand, a number of 
illustrative flights have been used. Since air travel prices are very hard to pin down (they depend 
on season, carrier, class, date of purchase, amongst other things), a price range has been used for 
each of the flights considered, corresponding to typical round trip fares of scheduled carriers. 
The impact on low cost air travel is not assessed, as there is still much uncertainty regarding the 
demand price elasticities for this market segment. Occupancy rate is assumed to be 70%, which 
is historically coherent with data from the ICAO Digest of Statistics (ICAO, 2002) for national 
and international flights from the European Union countries. Values of demand price elasticity 
for business and leisure air travel for short and long haul were obtained from Gillen et al (2004, 
chapter 4). These levels are widely accepted and coherent with other studies (Agarwall and 
Talley, 1985; Dargay and Hanly, 2002; Ippolito, 1981; Jorge-Calderón, 1997; Pickrell, 1984; 
Talley and Schwarz-Miller, 1988). A summary of the illustrative flights considered is shown in 
Table 4. 
Estimates of CO2 emissions for each flight were obtained using landing and take-off (LTO) 
and climb, cruise and descent (CCD) emission factors from the CORINAIR database (EEA, 
2005, annex of chapter B851), subsequently verified against PIANO simulation outputs. 
Treating LTO and CCD emissions separately increases the estimates' reliability, and proceeding 
otherwise would lead to an underestimation of fuel consumption in short haul flights. 
Nonetheless, the method used here remains fairly straightforward and presents few 
shortcomings, the most important of which is the fact that flight paths are not detailed and flight 
levels are not taken into account.  
One important assumption made in this study is that only flights departing from the EU are 
subject to the policies considered. The reasons for this assumption are (a) as of 2006 it has 
become clear that any policy targeted at reducing the emissions from aviation would need to be 
implemented in a sub-group of countries, as opposed to all the 188 countries which are 
members of the ICAO. As explained in Section 3.2 the ICAO has so far been unable to propose 
and commit to any incentive-based policy for mitigating emissions from aviation at a global 
scale; (b) the EU is responsible for more than half of the world’s air transport volume (EC, 
2005a, p.5); (c) the EU is the region where a concrete proposal for an emissions trading scheme 
for aviation exists and should this scheme evolve into a world-wide system, the charging of 
flights at departure would naturally evolve into the charging of all flights without double-
charging; (d) flights arriving from outside the EU eventually leave the EU and would be 
charged; and (e) the Eurocontrol database for flights leaving the EU is readily available, 
whereas no equivalent data base exists for all the flights worldwide. 
The assumption that only emissions from flights departing from the EU are subject to the 
two policies considered means that whereas the price of a London-Tokyo round trip will only be 
covered by the policies on the flight from London to Tokyo, the price of a Paris-London round 
trip ticket will suffer a dual impact. 
 
Table 4: Summary of illustrative flights used in demand impact calculations 
 
       
 
Origin 
 
Destination 
 
Length 
(km) 
 
Aircraft 
type 
 
Emissions 
(t CO2) 
 
Price range 
(2006 Euros) 
Price elasticity 
Business Leisure 
        
        
Paris London 346 A320 13.1248 €100-200 -0.730 -1.520 
   B737 12.2054 €100-200 -0.730 -1.520 
Madrid Berlin 1850 A321 38.0337 €200-400 -0.730 -1.520 
   B757 52.9837 €200-400 -0.730 -1.520 
Lisbon New York 5420 A330 117.2803 €900-1600 -0.265 -0.993 
   B767 92.1445 €900-1600 -0.265 -0.993 
London Tokyo 9589 A340 222.9469 €1200-2000 -0.265 -0.993 
   B777 242.4531 €1200-2000 -0.265 -0.993 
   B744 345.2611 €1200-2000 -0.265 -0.993 
        
 
Source: Emissions calculated using CORINAIR emission factors, verified against PIANO 
simulations. Elasticities compiled by Gillen et al (2004) for different flight categories 
  
The first policy alternative considered was an environmental charge of €42 per tonne of CO2 
and the results of this exercise are presented in Table 5. In spite of the diversity in assumptions 
and methods of calculation, the impact on prices obtained are in general consistent with values 
found in the literature (e.g. Bleijenberg and Wit, 1998; Dings et al, 2003; INFRAS, 2004; 
Pearce and Pearce, 2000). 
 The second policy alternative is the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS in a scenario of 
100% auctioning. This means that for every tonne of CO2 emitted by an operator's flight, one 
allowance must be bought and surrendered. Therefore, the impact on the ticket price will 
depend on the price at which the allowance is auctioned just as it depends on the level of an 
environmental charge in the first scenario. Impacts have been estimated for auction clearing 
prices of €7, €15 and €30 and are shown in Table 6. 
 The third policy option considered is actually the most plausible one for the 2013-2017 
trading period: it consists of including aviation in the EU ETS and of grandfathering allowances 
to operators. The allowances are grandfathered according to the operators' 2012 emissions, 
which means that for all emissions exceeding the 2012 baseline, allowances will have to be 
bought at market price. An exogenous growth rate of 4% in aviation emissions is used, which is 
consistent with the range of growth scenarios used by the IPCC (in IPCC, 1999, summary 
section 3). Under these assumptions, in 2017, operators would be obliged to buy allowances for 
approximately 21.67% of their emissions. The impact of the costs of buying these allowances in 
the market at different price levels is shown in Table 7. It is assumed that the opportunity costs 
of using the grandfathered allowances as opposed to selling them at market price is not passed 
on to customers. 
The total policy costs column in Tables 6 to 8 is computed as tonnes of CO2 emissions for 
the relevant flight multiplied by the emissions charge or allowance price expressed in €/tCO2. 
For the case of intra-European flights this is also multiplied by 2, as both departures (for way-
out and for way-in) would be from the EU and would be subject to the emissions charge or the 
ETS.  
Since it is assumed that airlines would pass the whole cost of the policy on to their 
customers, the column corresponding to the impact on ticket price in all three tables is 
computed as the total policy cost imposed on a given flight divided by the number of passengers 
in that flight, which was in turn computed using  70% as the seat occupancy rate for the relevant 
aircraft.  
As Tables 5 and 6 indicate, estimated percentage reductions in demand are very small, but 
this magnitude is also in line with other studies in the literature (Wit et al, 2002, p.39; Wit et al, 
2005, p.136; MVW, 2002, p.76). Simulations using the proprietary AERO Modelling System 
for example show that a fuel tax of US$ 0.20 per kilogram of fuel (approximately the equivalent 
of an emissions charge of €50 per tonne of CO2) would only reduce global passenger demand by 
7.5% (MVW, 2002, p.76).
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The most significant impacts occur in leisure travel, given the higher values of demand price 
elasticity for this market segment, and are stronger for short-haul flights. The reason for this can 
be found in the very high fuel consumption during the LTO cycle compared to CCD stages, 
making short-haul flights more fuel-intensive. However, whether the impact on demand is 
sufficiently strong to induce a decrease in the number of flights remains unclear. In fact, an 
airline's decision to reduce flights is a very complex one, and is likely to involve many other 
factors, such as long term airline strategy, historical occupancy rate and aircraft property costs. 
It is probable, on the other hand, that the reduction in demand would provide airlines with an 
additional incentive to reallocate aircraft and optimise passenger load factors in their flight 
network. It should be highlighted that longer term reactions from the industry are not being 
taken into account in the calculations. 
 
                                               
7 Although the AERO model simulates impacts worldwide, it allows the simulation of instruments implemented at 
EU level only. The same instruments used in this study were simulated with AERO and although the results refer to 
worldwide impacts, they are modest. The environmental charge of €42/tCO2 on all flights leaving from the EU gives 
the largest percentage reductions in fuel consumption and aircraft-km. These however never exceed 10% with respect 
to the base level, with the exception of EU-Asia routes, which would experience a reduction in fuel consumption of 
12%. 
 
Table 5: Effects on passenger demand of an environmental charge set at €42 per tonne of CO2 
 
       
 
Flight 
 
Aircraft 
 
Total policy 
costs 
 
Impact on 
ticket price 
Impact on demand 
Business Leisure 
        
        
Paris-London A320 €548.22 €5.22 1.91-3.81% 3.97-7.94% 
 B737 €512.63 €4.88 1.78-3.56% 3.71-7.42% 
Madrid-Berlin A321 €1,597.42 €12.34 2.25-4.50% 4.69-9.37% 
 B757 €2,225.32 €15.90 2.90-5.80% 6.04-12.08% 
Lisbon-NY B767 €3,870.07 €29.10 0.48-0.86% 1.81-3.21% 
 A332 €4,925.77 €23.85 0.40-0.70% 1.48-2.63% 
London-Tokyo B744 €14,500.97 €49.32 0.65-1.09% 2.45-4.08% 
 A346 €9,363.77 €35.20 0.47-0.78% 1.75-2.91% 
 B773 €10,183.03 €42.29 0.56-0.93% 2.10-3.50% 
        
 
Source: Impacts calculated using emissions obtained with CORINAIR emission factors, verified 
against PIANO simulations. Elasticities compiled by Gillen et al (2004) for different flight 
categories 
  
Results also suggest that, ceteris paribus, demand for flights will suffer a greater impact in 
flights where “kilometres flown per Euro paid for an air ticket” are higher. This conclusion, 
however, is based on the assumption of constant demand price elasticities, which might be 
regarded as an oversimplification. 
This conclusion, however, is non-trivial. Any hope of reducing emissions as a consequence 
of demand reduction would be placed on a reduction of leisure trips in the first place, and, 
within that group, in short-haul trips. The link between demand reduction and flights suppressed 
is missing and it cannot be established based on readily available information. The final 
reduction in the number of flights would partly determine the reduction in emissions from 
aviation. Cairns and Newson (2006, Figure 3.1, p.24) report that over 50% of all trips arriving 
or leaving from UK airports are for leisure purposes. If this share prevailed in the whole of the 
EU, then there would be a serious possibility of reducing emissions through the use of a charge, 
provided the number of flights were reduced in response to the reduction of passenger demand 
for leisure trips. Unfortunately there are no data available on the distribution of trip purposes for 
flights departing from different EU airports. 
 Taking into consideration the different levels of CO2 emitted by older (B757, B767) and 
newer (A321, A332) aircraft, it is reasonable to assume that the use of newer aircraft in a given 
flight would lead to smaller reductions in demand for that flight, since the impact of emissions 
on prices would be lower. This would suggest at first that economic instruments should provide 
airlines with an additional incentive for fleet renewal and should strengthen fuel-efficiency as a 
decision factor in aircraft purchase. However, it is unclear whether this difference in demand 
reduction is large enough for this incentive to be significant in the short term. Furthermore, it 
has been suggested (Wit et al, 2005, p.132) that airlines could make use of cross-subsidisation 
to balance the negative effects that the older share of their fleet might have on demand. 
 Amongst different policy options, it is clear that the environmental charge of €42 per tonne 
of CO2 has the greatest impact on demand, followed by the ETS scenario with an auction 
clearing price of €30 per allowance. That being said, one can notice that the use of 
grandfathering as a method of allocation reduces the intensity of the demand-side effects. In the 
cases considered, when allowances are grandfathered, the reductions in demand are negligible. 
Given that all policy costs are passed on to customers and that it is assumed that the purchase of 
additional allowances is preferred to supply-side abatement measures, it can be concluded that, 
in this scenario, including aviation in the ETS will have virtually no impact on the emissions of 
the air transport sector itself. 
 The case for auctioning is not strong either, since aviation would still be included in a 
scheme where the price of allowances is determined by demand from all participants, and 
therefore inextricably linked to abatement costs of every trading sector. Given that abatement 
measures in air transport are much more expensive than in other sectors, aircraft operators are 
likely to become mere purchasers of allowances. This idea is further developed in section 5, 
where theoretical, political and feasibility considerations are taken into account in a broader 
comparison of the use of price and quantity controls in the air transport sector. 
 
Table 6: Estimated impact of the inclusion of the aviation sector in the EU ETS on ticket prices (100% auctioning scenario) 
 
             
  Allowances at 7€/tCO2 Allowances at 15€/tCO2 Allowances at 30€/tCO2 
Flight Aircraft Total 
policy 
costs 
Impact 
on ticket 
price 
Impact on Demand Total 
policy 
costs 
Impact 
on ticket 
price 
Impact on Demand Total 
policy 
costs 
Impact 
on ticket 
price 
Impact on Demand 
Business Leisure Business Leisure Business Leisure 
              
              
Paris-London A320 €91.37 €0.87 0.32-0.64% 0.66-1.32% €195.79 €1.86 0.68-1.36% 1.42-2.83% €391.58 €3.73 1.36-2.72% 2.83-5.67% 
 B737 €85.44 €0.81 0.30-0.59% 0.62-1.24% €183.08 €1.74 0,64-1,27% 1.33-2.65% €366.16 €3.49 1.27-2.55% 2.65-5.30% 
Madrid-Berlin A321 €266.24 €2.06 0.38-0.75% 0.78-1.56% €570.51 €4.41 0.80-1.61% 1.67-3.35% €1141.01 €8.81 1.61-3.22% 3.35-6.70% 
 B757 €370.89 €2.65 0.48-0.97% 1.01-2.01% €794.76 €5.68 1.04-2.07% 2.16-4.31% €1589.51 €11.35 2.07-4.14% 4.31-8.63% 
Lisbon-NY B767 €645.01 €4.85 0.08-0.14% 0.30-0.54% €1382.17 €10.39 0.17-0.31% 0.64-1.15% €2764.33 €20.78 0.34-0.64% 1.29-2.29% 
 A332 €820.96 €3.98 0.07-0.12% 0.25-0.44% €1759.20 €8.52 0.14-0.25% 0.53-0.94% €3518.41 €17.04 0.28-0.50% 1.06-1.88% 
London-Tokyo B744 €2416.83 €8.22 0.11-0.18% 0.41-0.68% €5178.92 €17.62 0.23-0.39% 0.87-1.46% €10357.83 €35.23 0.47-0.78% 1.75-2.92% 
 A346 €1560.63 €5.87 0.08-0.13% 0.29-0.49% €3344.20 €12.57 0.17-0.28% 0.62-1.04% €6688.41 €25.14 0.33-0.56% 1.25-2.08% 
 B773 €1697.17 €7.05 0.09-0.16% 0.35-0.58% €3636.80 €15.10 0.20-0.33% 0.75-1.25% €7273.59 €30.21 0.40-0.67% 1.50-2.50% 
              
 
Source: Impacts calculated using emissions obtained with CORINAIR emission factors, verified against PIANO simulations. Elasticities compiled by Gillen et al (2004) for different 
flight categories. 
 
 
Table 7: Estimated impact of the inclusion of the aviation sector in the EU ETS on 2017 ticket prices (grandfathering scenario with a 2012 baseline target) 
 
             
  Allowances at 7€/tCO2 Allowances at 15€/tCO2 Allowances at 30€/tCO2 
Flight Aircraft Total 
policy 
costs 
Impact 
on ticket 
price 
Impact on Demand Total 
policy 
costs 
Impact 
on ticket 
price 
Impact on Demand Total 
policy 
costs 
Impact 
on ticket 
price 
Impact on Demand 
Business Leisure Business Leisure Business Leisure 
              
              
Paris-London A320 €19.80 €0.19 0.07-0.14% 0.14-0.29% €42.42 €0.40 0.15-0.29% 0.31-0.61% €84.84 €0.81 0.29-0.59% 0.61-1.22% 
 B737 €18.51 €0.18 0.06-0.13% 0.13-0.27% €39.66 €0.38 0.14-0.28% 0.29-0.57% €79.33 €0.76 0.28-0.55% 0.57-1.15% 
Madrid-Berlin A321 €57.68 €0.45 0.08-0.16% 0.17-0.34% €123.60 €0.95 0.17-0.35% 0.36-0.73% €247.20 €1.91 0.35-0.70% 0.73-1.45% 
 B757 €80.35 €0.57 0.10-0.21% 0.22-0.44% €172.19 €1.23 0.22-0.45% 0.47-0.93% €344.37 €2.46 0.45-0.90% 0.93-1.87% 
Lisbon-NY B767 €139.74 €1.05 0.02-0.03% 0.07-0.12% €299.45 €2.25 0.04-0.07% 0.14-0.25% €598.90 €4.50 0.07-0.13% 0.28-0.50% 
 A332 €177.86 €0.86 0.01-0.03% 0.05-0.10% €381.14 €1.85 0.03-0.05% 0.11-0.20% €762.27 €3.69 0.06-0.11% 0.23-0.41% 
London-
Tokyo 
B744 €523.61 €1.78 0.02-0.04% 0.09-0.15% €1122.03 €3.82 0.05-0.08% 0.19-0.32% €2244.05 €7.63 0.10-0.17% 0.38-0.63% 
 A346 €338.11 €1.27 0.02-0.03% 0.06-0.11% €724.53 €2.72 0.04-0.06% 0.14-0.23% €1449.06 €5.45 0.07-0.12% 0.27-0.45% 
 B773 €367.70 €1.53 0.02-0.03% 0.08-0.13% €787.92 €3.27 0.04-0.07% 0.16-0.27% €1575.8
5 
€6.54 0.09-
0.14% 
0.32-
0.54% 
              
 
Source: Impacts calculated using emissions obtained with CORINAIR emission factors, verified against PIANO simulations. Elasticities compiled by Gillen et al (2004) for different 
flight categories. 
 
5. Prices vs. Quantities 
A standard result in environmental economics is that even though environmental charges and a 
system of tradable emission permits are identically efficient in a perfect-information scenario
8
, 
they differ in efficiency under uncertainty (Weitzman, 1974). 
 In the case where the Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve is known with certainty but 
the Marginal Social Benefit (MSB) curve is not, quantity and price controls will result in 
welfare losses of equal magnitude. However, if marginal abatement costs are not known with 
certainty, the performances of both types of instruments differ. Both types of policies result in 
undesirable effects, but the relative magnitude of these effects for each policy depends on the 
shapes of the MAC and MSB curves (Baumol and Oates, 1988, p.63). In general, the steeper the 
slope of the MSB curve relative to the MAC curve, the less severe the magnitude of the 
distortions caused by tradable permits compared to that caused by charges will be; and the 
steeper the slope of the MAC curve relative to the MSB curve, the more severe the magnitude 
of the distortions caused by tradable permits compared to that caused by charges will be. 
 The first conclusion makes a strong case for the use of emission charges in aviation, given 
that marginal damage of aviation emissions (and therefore the marginal social benefit derived 
from their reduction) is fairly constant (Carlsson and Hammar, 2002, p.370). The second 
conclusion, on the other hand, is not immediately applicable to aviation, mainly because very 
little is known about MAC curves for this sector.
9
 In any case, if the MSB and MAC curves are 
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 If the optimum amount of permits is made available in the market, their price will be bid up to exactly the level of 
the optimal Pigouvian tax, provided that social damage and abatement cost functions are perfectly known. 
9
 ICF (2006, p.12) has produced curves for the marginal cost of carbon instruments (allowances, credits and 
abatement measures) as a function of the amounts abated, which suggest that the marginal costs of abating emissions 
in the aviation sector might be steep. The general shape of the curves obtained allow for three very distinct regions to 
be identified: one where marginal costs are negative, corresponding to the decision of selling the allowances that 
were grandfathered to the sector; one where marginal costs are fairly constant in the 10-30 €/t region, corresponding 
to the sector buying allowances at market prices; and one where the costs per tonne undergo a very sudden convex 
assumed to be linear, an emissions charge will be preferable to an emissions trading scheme 
provided that the absolute value of the slope of the cost curve is greater than that of the marginal 
benefits curve (Baumol and Oates, p.68). Regarding aviation emissions, this condition on the 
relative slopes of the MAC and MSB curves is very likely to be satisfied, which would mean, at 
least theoretically, that price controls are preferable to quantity controls for mitigating emissions 
from this sector.
10
 
 
5.1 Stakeholder views 
Although an emissions charge equal to the social cost of carbon may sound attractive from the 
point of view of reducing emissions, it would probably not find much consensus within the 
aviation industry, mainly because of the very high costs of emission abatement, which would 
leave airlines with no option but to face the cost of their environmental externality. 
Amongst airlines and international aviation organisations, emissions trading is by far the 
preferred instrument to be employed. Open trading with other sectors, allocation of allowances 
by grandfathering and the coverage of CO2 alone are defended by most airlines as elements of 
design of the scheme (British Airways, 2005, p.5; EC, 2005b, p.26; Thompson, 2006, p.2).
 An interesting case is that of Lufthansa: it is one of the few airlines that opposes to the 
inclusion of aviation in the ETS. According to Karlheinz Haag, Head of Environmental Issues 
of the company, in a recent presentation at the CarbonExpo 2006 (Cologne, Germany), this 
measure would bring unacceptable costs and risks to the industry, whereas the environmental 
impact would be negligible (see Haag, 2006, p.2). 
                                                                                                                                         
increase, corresponding to the adoption of abatement measures. The shape of this third region of the curve suggests 
that the marginal cost of abatement in the sector of aviation might be steep. 
10
 This conclusion could be challenged on the grounds that, if abatement measures are indeed assumed to be much 
too expensive to be considered by operators, this context is equivalent to a perfect information scenario where 
abatement costs are known, but are prohibitively high. Therefore, Weitzman's conclusions of non-equivalence 
between price and quantity controls do not apply even if there is some uncertainty on the costs of these measures.  
 Amongst aircraft manufacturers, the idea of employing any economic instrument to mitigate 
emissions from aviation does not find much support. Some manufacturers feel that this would 
have little impact on the reduction of fuel consumption and that the additional burden on airlines 
could actually slow down fleet renewal (EC, 2005b, p.20). 
 Other energy intensive sectors currently participating in the EU ETS are strongly opposed to 
the inclusion of aviation in the scheme. They believe that, since air transport has a very low 
amount of CO2 emissions per unit of sales and is perfectly able to pass on the policy costs to 
customers (as seen in section 4), the position of airlines in the EU ETS would be reduced to that 
of a net purchaser of allowances (EC, 2005b, p.5). The view of these sectors is that, including 
aviation would therefore accelerate the increase in allowance price and reduce the amount of 
allowances available to other sectors, impairing their competitiveness (EC, 2005b, p.27). ICF, 
(2006) and Wit et al (2005), on the other hand, show that, even if aircraft operators opt not to 
abate at all, the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS would have virtually no impact on the price 
of allowances.  
 Throughout this study, it has been argued that public opinion has a very negative view of the 
aviation business concerning the environment. In a recent public consultation by the European 
Union (EC, 2005b, p.3), 82% of respondents stated that they would fully support the inclusion 
of air transport in the EU environmental policy framework. Many of them felt that aviation 
enjoys an unfair advantage in comparison to other modes of travel, since it is exempt from many 
types of taxes (e.g. VAT and fuel taxes) (EC, 2005b, p.11). 
 It is also worth noting that there is a widespread belief amongst air transport stakeholders 
that the impact of aviation emissions on the environment is overestimated by public opinion 
(Thompson, 2006, p.1). Airlines admit they have very little potential for reducing emissions, but 
they also recognise the existence of a serious public image issue (Thompson, 2006, p.1). In this 
context, it appears reasonable that the majority of airlines support the participation of aviation in 
the EU ETS, as it would help improve their perception by the public while keeping the impact 
on costs and demand to a minimum. This is why the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS is 
perceived by some as a strategy for the sector to postpone dealing with its impact on climate 
change, whilst cleaning its image (EC, 2005b, p.27). 
 
5.2 A pragmatic analysis 
The choice of a policy instrument is, above all, a political decision. Therefore, it is very unlikely 
that any choice will be made without regard to more practical aspects, such as transaction, 
organisation and compliance costs for each of the policy alternatives, barriers to new entrants, 
pressure and support from the industry and the nature of the reduction targets themselves. This 
is why, for example, revenue-neutral charges and grandfathering of permits are not at all 
unrealistic policy options, even if from a theoretical point of view they are much less stringent. 
It must be highlighted, in addition, that the theoretical comparison between price and quantity 
controls presented in section 5 limited its analysis to static policy designs. Timely revisions of 
the economic policy can amend what would otherwise comprise very unsatisfactory policy 
choices. 
 From the regulator's point of view, there is one main advantage of using the EU ETS for the 
mitigation of emissions from air transport, which is the fact that the effect in terms of emissions 
reductions is known – a very desirable characteristic in a potentially target-oriented post-2012 
scenario. Another argument put forward by the EU is that the addition of more sectors to the 
trading system helps diluting compliance and transaction costs (EC, 2000, pp.27-28). 
Nonetheless, the very presence in the EU ETS of other sectors with much cheaper abatement 
options than those in aviation creates a rather problematic situation: in its current form, 
emissions trading will not lead to any reduction in air transport emissions in the near future. In 
fact, despite their plurality in nature (as seen in section 4.1), emission abatement opportunities 
in aviation appear to be prohibitively costly for any open multi-sector trading scheme to 
function properly. Since its inclusion in the EU ETS is expected to have little or no impact on 
allowance prices, airlines will simply choose to buy allowances from other sectors instead of 
abating their own emissions, as this will be much more cost-effective. 
 From the perspective of aircraft operators, there are many benefits in participating in the EU 
ETS as opposed to being subject to emission charges. The main advantage is that, assuming that 
the allocation method is kept unchanged until 2012, operators are likely to receive most of the 
allowances they will need for free
11
. Furthermore, as results presented in section 4.2 have 
shown, airlines would be fully able to pass on the cost of allowances to customers without 
creating significant negative impacts on demand. 
 From the point of view of social efficiency, transaction costs comprise an important 
component that could a priori be seen as an argument against the use of emissions trading in 
aviation. However, these costs are likely to be well absorbed when the trading entities are large 
companies, whereas a market with numerous small trading entities would be better suited for the 
implementation of an emissions charge (Tietenberg, 1990, p.30). It is safe to say that the airline 
market would fit the first category. 
 
6. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
Emissions from air transport are a complex issue. They have a significant impact on climate 
change, representing over 3.5% of all radiative forcing from human activity and yet they 
represent, in monetary terms, less than 0.03% of the GDP as an externality in the EU, as 
calculated in section 2.1. 
 Though widely seen as an environmentally unfriendly activity, aviation has had very little 
political pressure to curb its emissions in the last decades. Therefore, one might regard the 
recent proposals to include air transport in the EU environmental policy framework as a big step 
towards the internalisation of external costs of the sector. However, the conditions through 
which this is made – the choice of economic instruments, the level of stringency of the 
                                               
11
 One should add that, in the event of a severe drop in the level of activity of the aviation sector, aircraft operators 
would be able to sell unused allowances to other sectors. Since most of these allowances would have been received at 
no cost, participation in the EU ETS could also be regarded as a form of insurance. 
emissions cap or the charge level adopted – are of utmost importance to determine the 
magnitude of the resulting abatement. 
 It is clear from the results in section 4 that neither of the policy alternatives considered for 
the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS – auctioning or grandfathering – are able to curb 
emissions from the aviation sector itself. An environmental charge set at the estimated social 
cost of CO2 would achieve a reduction if leisure trips, which correspond to flights with 
relatively higher elasticities, represent an important share in the total number of trips. Data on 
flight purpose for Europe are not collected, and therefore there is at present no way of 
estimating the potential reduction in emissions. 
From the demand perspective, reductions are proportional to the increase in prices caused by 
each type of policy, and therefore depend on the real costs imposed on aircraft operators. On the 
supply side, abatement alternatives are abundant, but simply not worth their price compared to 
the stringency of any of the instruments at the prices considered. In this context, it can be 
concluded that the choice of economic instrument within the air transport sector is in fact 
dependant on the objective of the regulator. 
 If the objective is to curb emissions from the air transport sector itself, then it is imperative 
that aviation is treated separately from other sectors. The reason for this is that, in any multi-
sector policy, the target pursued by the regulator is an aggregated one, be it in terms of total 
reductions (quantity controls) or marginal abatement costs (price controls). In this case, the 
determination of the cap or the charge level will take into account abatement costs from all 
sectors, and the functioning of economic instruments will cause emissions to be curbed in those 
sectors where these costs are lower. It should be stressed that it is in fact a desirable 
characteristic of economic instruments and not an imperfection. 
 Under this condition, treating the air transport sector separately would allow for its own 
abatement costs to be the determinant factors of the stringency of the regulation. Two main 
alternatives could be envisaged, in terms of IB regulation: the implementation of an en-route 
emissions charge and the creation of an isolated emissions trading scheme for aviation. The first 
proposition might be favoured a priori due to its theoretical superiority to quantity controls 
under uncertainty, but one must be aware that the implementation of such a measure would face 
ferocious resistance from the industry, as explained in section 5. The second proposition would 
involve greater organisation and transaction costs in its implementation, but the flexibility in 
many variables of the design of such a scheme could probably be used for bargaining with the 
sector and therefore obtaining wider support. A proposal to introduce a separate dedicated 
scheme for aviation emissions was produced by the European Parliament on 4 July 2006 
(European Parliament, 2006), on the basis that accounting would be simplified by a separate, 
closed system. This proposal went further to say that if the aviation sector were eventually 
incorporated into a wider ETS, a cap on the number of emission allowances it would permitted 
to buy from the market should be imposed, together with a requirement of minimum emission 
reduction without trading, before being allowed to buy permits. 
 If the aviation sector were included in the EU ETS, the addition of this new sector to the 
scheme would help dilute transaction and organisation costs, and the regulator would have the 
advantage of knowing the resulting reduction in advance. Even though the use of charges would 
still be theoretically superior under uncertainty, this would in all likelihood be counterbalanced 
by the support received from stakeholders.  
 Should the 2006 proposal by the EU Parliament to impose special conditions on the air 
transport sector for its inclusion in the EU ETS be actually implemented, the sector would be 
forced to comply with a minimum required reduction before being able to trade. Once airlines 
enter trading, Once airlines enter trading, it can be expected that they will become net buyers of 
allowances, given their high abatement costs relatively to other sectors, and no further emission 
reductions would be expected from aviation from this point on. This would, however, tighten 
the aggregate cap for the remaining sectors, thus fulfilling the primary objective of the ETS: to 
make emission reductions take place where they are the cheapest.  
 From the perspective of airlines and air transport organisations, the inclusion of aviation in 
the EU ETS with no special conditions has some very clear advantages. Firstly, given the 
current use of grandfathering as the method of initial allocation, it is likely that the inclusion of 
the sector in the EU ETS will impose much smaller costs on aircraft operators than it would be 
the case with the adoption of emissions trading under auctioning, emission charges or any type 
of policy where aviation were treated separately. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, 
becoming a participant in  the current EU ETS, even if under no special conditions, would 
represent an excellent opportunity for airlines to improve their public image at very small costs 
and with little or no reduction of its own emissions. This would explain, at least in part, the 
support that the majority of these stakeholders have been demonstrating towards the adoption of 
quantity controls in aviation.  
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